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  This chapter, originally written as a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, provides an elementary, everyday introduction to the concepts of 
risk and insurance.  Conceptually, risk has two dimensions:  a potential loss, and the 
chance of that loss being realized.  People can, however, transfer risk to insurance 
companies against the payment of so-called premiums.  In practice, however, one 
needs accurate assessments of both losses and probabilities to judge whether 
premiums are appropriate.  For many risks, this poses little problem (e.g., life 
insurance); however, it is difficult to assess risks of many other kinds of events such 
as acts of terrorism.  It is emphasized, that through evolution and learning, people are 
able to handle many of the common risks that they face in life.  But when people lack 
experience (e.g., new technologies, threats of terrorism), risk can only be assessed 
through imagination.  Not surprisingly, insurance companies demand high prices 
when risks are poorly understood.  In particular, the cost of insurance against possible 
acts of terrorism soared after September 11. How should people approach risk after 
the events of that day?  Clearly, the world needs to protect itself from the acts of 
terrorists and other disturbed individuals. However, it is also important to address the 
root causes of such antisocial movements.  It is, therefore, suggested that programs 
addressed at combatting ignorance, prejudice, and social inequalities may be more 
effective premiums for reducing the risk of terrosrtism than has been recognized to 
date. 
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  Following the devastating events of September 11, 2001 it has become 
commonplace to hear statements to the effect that the world has become a “riskier” 
place. However, what do people mean by this statement?  And – if we accept that it is 
true – how does it affect the way that people do and should behave?  The purpose of 
this chapter is to shed some light on these questions. However, because the questions 
are quite general, the impacts of beliefs about a riskier world are limited to an 
important dimension of the business world – the supply of and demand for insurance.   
 
At first blush, one might imagine that, with the advanced level of today’s 
technology, the business community would have evolved sophisticated procedures for 
handling issues of risk and insurance following the atrocities of September 11, 2001. 
This turns out not to be the case.  The reason – as we shall explain below – is that 
although the concepts of risk and insurance are simple to understand, it is not always 
clear how they should be applied in practice, and particularly after the occurrence of 




What is risk? 
 
  When used in everyday speech, the word risk is typically associated with an 
activity that involves some chance of incurring a loss or “negative outcome.”  Thus, 
for example, driving an automobile involves risk because, as we all know, accidents 
can and do happen.  Indeed, it is impossible to live without engaging in acts that 
involve some degree of risk (consider crossing a road or even eating in a restaurant).    
Moreover, the mere fact of being alive can be thought of as being risky in the sense 
that there is always some chance that we could suddenly die for a variety of reasons. 
 
From an analytical perspective, the risk of an activity can be thought of as 
having two components.  One is the chance or probability that the negative outcome 
will occur; the second is the size of the outcome.  Generally speaking, the larger the 
probability and potential loss, the greater the “risk.”  Risk can therefore be increased 
or decreased by taking actions that affect the sizes of the loss and the probability of its 
occurrence.  Thus, for example, you may decrease the risk in driving an automobile 
by wearing a seatbelt (i.e., the potential loss is smaller than if no seatbelt is worn); or 
you may increase the risk by driving recklessly (i.e., you increase the probability of an 
accident).  
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Conceptually then, it is easy to think about risk.  Many of the actions we take 
can be thought of as gambles with possible negative outcomes.  If we are lucky, we 
don’t lose, e.g., we don’t have an automobile accident or die before a certain date. To 
make the concept of risk operational, however, is much more difficult.  From an 
analytical perspective, you have to “know” the probability of the loss occurring and 
the amount of the potential loss.  How do people do this? 
 
Risk and insurance 
 
  The insurance industry exists because people are willing to pay sums of 
money  – or incur sure losses – to avoid the chance of incurring larger losses. To 
illustrate, imagine that you have just bought a new computer and are concerned about 
the possibility of its being stolen. One option open to you is to insure your computer 
against theft.  That is, by paying a fixed sum of money – or premium – to an insurance 
company, the latter undertakes to pay you a larger sum of money (e.g., sufficient to 
buy a new computer) in the event that your computer is stolen.  In other words, 
instead of you facing the possible negative consequences of a gamble (i.e., the loss of 
your computer), you pay someone else to accept the risk in your place.  However, 
how does the insurance company decide what premium to charge, and how do you 
decide whether this is reasonable? 
  
For this system to work, the insurance company needs to know the 
probabilities and amounts of potential losses as well as to have a sufficient number of 
clients so that the sum of the premiums collected is large enough to pay for any losses 
that are incurred.  In the case of computers, insurance companies typically have 
extensive data on the frequencies of theft and the amounts of past losses and can 
therefore price their premiums so that they are not likely to lose money.  They also 
rely on the fact that they are selling insurance to many clients for many different types 
of risk so that it is unlikely that they will face exceptional losses in all areas of their 
activities at the same time (i.e., they adopt a portfolio approach whereby they don’t 
place “all their eggs in the same basket.”) 
 
 As to consumers (e.g., computer owners), they typically do not have access to 
the data used by insurance companies but typically rely on “feelings” as to how badly 
they want the insurance (to be discussed below). In addition, many consumers know 
that there is a market for insurance in computer theft and that competition between 
insurance companies can prevent prices from becoming “unfair.”  In other words, the 
consumer can shop around.   
 
Some consumers of insurance, however, can be as  well informed as the 
insurance companies and do collect data about frequencies and amounts of past losses 
that they can use to evaluate the premiums of insurance companies.  Imagine, for 
example, a large corporation that has thousands of computers.  In this case, the 
customer (the corporation) may well be able to negotiate a special premium with an 
insurance company or, if it thinks this is still too expensive, decide to accept the risk 
itself (this is sometimes known as self-insurance).  
  
In short, the insurance market provides a mechanism for quantifying risk that 
is expressed by the premiums paid to insure against specific risks. However, this 
mechanism depends heavily on two factors: one is the availability of past data that can   5
be used to assess probabilities and losses; the second is competition between 
insurance companies that lets customers have some confidence in the level at which 
premiums are priced.  
 
Conceptually, you could arrange for an insurance contract for a wide variety of 
different activities and, in fact, this happens. For example, pop singers buy insurance 
to avoid losses that could occur if their voices were damaged; pianists insure their 
hands; and so on.  Indeed, Lloyds of London has made a specialty out of insuring 
people against the occurrence of many bizarre events. However, if there are no data 
on which probabilities and losses can be assessed, and few or no companies interested 
in offering insurance, the assessment of risk is problematic.  Moreover, whereas as 
much daily activity  can  – and is  – covered by insurance (consider, e.g., life and 
medical insurance), there is much that is not.  This therefore raises the more general 
issue of how people assess risks in life and particularly when they do not have access 
to statistical data.  
 
 
Handling risk in everyday life 
 
It is important to realize that risk is not a new phenomenon and that dealing 
with risk is something that humans have done ever since they evolved as a species. 
From an evolutionary perspective, therefore, one should expect that we would have 
developed innate mechanisms for handling risk and, in fact, this is true – up to a point.   
The mechanism that we all possess is the emotion of fear and it is illuminating to 
consider how this works. 
 
Imagine that you are walking down a city street when suddenly you hear the 
bark of a vicious-sounding dog just behind you.  Your immediate – and automatic 
reaction is of one fear – and this is accompanied by an involuntary movement away 
from the sound of the dog. In other words, fear stimulates an action on your part that 
helps you remove yourself from the source of danger. In this sense, the emotion of 
fear  – and the reaction that it provokes  – is part of our natural endowment for 
handling risky situations.  Note well, there is no attempt to assess risk from the 
analytical perspective described above, i.e., estimating the chances that the dog will 
attack you and the possible physical damage that could result from such an attack.  
Instead, there is just one simple emotion and reaction that removes you from a “bad” 
situation.    
 
The point I am making is that we do have “automatic systems” for handling 
situations that we recognize as risky.  Thus, it is important to investigate the origins of 
these systems and to recognize both their possibilities and limitations.
1   
 
Our ability to recognize dangerous situations and to react in consequence can 
be thought of as having two sources. One is natural in the sense that it is inherited 
through evolution; the other is learned.  Psychologists have made extensive studies of 
learning and it is quite clear that many fear reactions are the result of past experiences.  
Thus, individuals can differ significantly in how they react to different stimuli 
depending on their idiosyncratic experiences. One person, for example, may be quite 
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afraid when flying in an airplane because of previous bad experiences; a second may 
feel little or no fear.  The critical point about learning is that people have either 
experienced a negative outome (or “loss”) personally or they have been socialized by 
others (e.g., a parent) to associate potential losses with certain activities.   
 
It can be safely said that our understanding of how evolution has shaped us to 
experience fear in the face of specific stimuli is less complete than our understanding 
of learning.  However, our ability to acquire the response of fear is a genetically 
inherited mechanism.  In addition, there is evidence that it takes very little exposure to 
acquire fear reactions to some stimuli and yet not to others. For example, it takes only 
one or two exposures for people to acquire a fear of snakes, spiders, and heights and 
yet, these same people may experience far less fear when crossing a busy intersection 
in a city (which for them might be objectively more dangerous).  It just seems that we 
are better “prepared” to learn fear reactions from some kinds of stimuli than others. 
For example, early in the 20
th century, the pioneering learning psychologist John B. 
Watson demonstrated that he could teach – in a conditioning experiment – an 11-
month boy to become afraid of a white rat, a rabbit, and a dog when these were paired 
with a startling noise.  However, an attempt to replicate his experimental procedure 
failed when conventional objects such as blocks of wood and cloth curtains were 
paired with the startling noise. 
 
More recently, neuroscientific studies of the brain indicate that people process 
information concerning fear reactions in two distinct areas. Key to the fast, automatic 
reactions is the amygdala, a small, peanut-sized organ that lies deep in the back of the 
brain.  The amygdala receives information directly from the sensory thalamus and 
uses this to initiate evasive action if danger is signaled.  This level of processing, 
however, is approximate in the sense that it does not involve detailed analysis of the 
impending danger.  It acts as a kind of reflex to a class of stimuli.  The incoming 
information, however, will also be processed – albeit in a slower and more thorough 
manner – in the neo-cortex at the front of the brain and this will allow a more precise 
identification of the potential danger and the apropriateness of different actions.  This 
slower processing, however, will typically take place after evasive action has already 
been enacted (e.g., you took evasive action automatically after hearing the dog’s bark 
and only afterwards were you able to assess the real risk when you saw – from a safe 
distance – that the dog was well secured).  Clearly, it is functional for the first system 
to act quickly even if it is mistaken on occasion.  More generally, several researchers 
believe that our emotional decision making systems – that work without our conscious 
awareness – are tuned through experience to pick up “markers” or signals of potential 
danger and that they help us to avoid making the wrong decisions by eliminating 
dangerous alternatives from consideration.
2   
 
 
Risk and past experience. Both evolution and our learning history endow us 
with fear reactions that can stand us in good stead when we are confronted with 
potentially dangerous situations.  In facing the dangers in today’s world, however, 
both mechanisms suffer from the same disadvantage.  They only provide reactions to 
situations that have been experienced in the past and cannot handle risks or dangers 
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that are “new.”  Indeed, if we rely only on our emotions (whether inherited or learned) 
to guide our risky decision making, we are liable to suffer many losses.  
 
The sociologist Charles Perrow has made an interesting analysis of this 
situation from a larger societal perspective.  In a book entitled Normal Accidents he 
makes the point that  society typically learns to handle new technologies by 
responding to breakdowns or “accidents.”
3  For example, regulations for fire hazrds 
that involve limiting the number of people who can be present in buildings at the 
same time were not the result of authorities planning what might happen when many 
people crowded into the same building. Instead, they are a result of what society 
learned from past accidents where people died.  Similarly, the loads that bridges can 
take were not always forecast but calculated in light of past experiences; and traffic 
regulations were implemented incrementally as society gained experience with 
accidents. Thus, argues Perrow, if society continues to act in the same fashion, 
accidents will also occur when new technological advances are introduced – indeed, 
they are inevitable or “normal.” Lacking past experience that could signal danger, it is 
human nature to continue to push the frontier until something happens.  As a recent 
example, consider Concorde, the supersonic jet that flew commerically without a fatal 
accident for some 25 years. Note that the fact that Concorde was (or is) a safe 
technology was re-inforced on a daily basis for a quarter of a century. However, when 
an unimagined and life-causing accident did occur after this long accident-free 
service, the airplane had to undergo substantial modifications of its undercarriage to 
avoid similar accidents in the future.  And yet, for the first 25 years of its service, no 
fatal accidents had occurred and no-one saw the need to introduce the modifications. 
 
It should be clear that, in an increasingly technological and complex society, 
we cannot rely only on our emotions of fear  – whether these are determined 
genetically or environmentally (i.e., the result of experience) – to assess risk and find 
means to deal with it.   Instead, people’s assessments of the components of risk (i.e., 
the chances and the amounts of potential losses) must i nvolve their subjective 
perceptions of what these are likely to be in the future.  In turn, such assessments must 
depend on imaginary as opposed to “real” experience.  And indeed, many studies of 
risk assessment over the last 30 years have highlighted the role played by imagination.  
Sometimes, people fail to imagine the possibility of certain risks occurring and so fail 
to take protective actions (e.g., the Concorde example, given above). On other 
occasions, people’s imagination may lead them to believe that risks are greater than 
more objective analysis might show.  In both cases, the way in which people acquire 
and process the information on which their assessments are based can have important 
impacts on their beliefs. 
 
In the final analysis, then, people’s assessments of risk depend on both their 
experience with situations that are similar to those they are currently facing – and 
particularly their feelings towards those situations – and their imagination of what the 
future might hold.  In the case of insurance companies dealing with everyday events 
such as theft and general life insurance, it is clear that they are able to quantify their 
experience with all the data that are available to them.  But individuals who face risk 
– and for whom data might not be available – are obliged to use their imagination, 
which, as it turns out, can be affected by many factors. 
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Risk and imagination. One way to characterize people’s assessments of risk is 
to explore what affects their imagination of risky events occurring.  At a rough 
approximation – and holding size of negative outcomes constant – the easier it is for 
people to imagine a risky event happening, the more likely they are to perceive it as 
risky.  What then affects people’s imaginations? 
 
Let’s start with risks that people don’t imagine and which therefore do not 
represent risks from their point of view.   There are many of these in everyday life.  
For example (and as noted earlier), each time you walk down a street you could have 
an accident. However, the possibility of accidents such as these rarely comes to the 
attention of a fit, able person. In a sense, these accidents fall below the threshold of 
imagination and thus worry. Second, there are many activities where people feel “in 
control” and thus do not see the risks in the same way as others might.  For example, 
when considering their ability in driving automobiles (and thus their propensity not to 
have accidents), most people consider themselves to be well “above average.”   
Similarly, many business people do not consider that they are engaged in risky 
decision making because, not only are they in control of what they are doing, they are 
also experienced.
4  Finally, there are many decisions where people do not experience 
any immediate negative feedback from taking risky actions and thus may fail to see 
the link between what they do now and what happens in the future.  For example, the 
effects of eating foods with high levels of cholesterol or smoking are delayed in time.  
In both cases, the activities are pleasurable and negative consequences will not be 
experienced until much later.  In fact, even if people “know” about the negative 
effects of tobacco and cholesterol, neither of these has much meaning to them if the 
consequences occur in a distant future with which they cannot identify.   
 
There are many ways in which events can become easier to imagine and thus 
be perceived as more risky. First, consider the difference between describing the risk 
of an event in terms of statistics or stories.  For example, one can describe how certain 
behavior can lead to a disease by factually presenting statistics, for example, specific 
activities increase the chances of contracting an unpleasant disease from .001 to .002.   
Alternatively, you could describe – in detail – how someone contracted the disease 
and its consequences for the person. Moreover, when the person described is relevant 
to the audience, the impact of the description will be greater than the statistics.  
Second, the manner in which statistics are presented can have further effects. For 
example, in one study, experienced forensic psychologists were asked to assess the 
risk of allowing a patient to be discharged from a mental hospital after being provided 
with data about similar past cases. Data presented in different formats produced quite 
different results. When the rate of past recividism was presented in frequencies (i.e., 
20 out of 100), 41 percent refused to discharge the patient. When it was presented in 
probabilistic form (i.e., a 20 percent chance), only 21 percent refused.
5  
 
A further example highlights how making the description of an event very 
specific can induce people to see it as much more risky. In an investigation of the 
effects of wording on people’s intentions to buy insurance for air travel, researchers 
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found that that people were willing to pay more for a policy that would insure them 
against “terrorist acts” as opposed to death from “all possible causes.”
6  And yet, as 
must be obvious to the reader, death from terrorist acts is only one of many ways that 
could lead to death on an airplane.  However, because this scenario was made explicit, 
it became more salient to people thereby increasing their perception of the risk as 
measured by their willingness to pay an insurance premium. 
 
Following a series of extensive investigations over more than 20 years into 
how people perceive the risk associated with new technologies, psychologist Paul 
Slovic and his colleagues have determined two important dimensions.  One they call 
dread and the other risk of the unknown.
7  The former includes feelings of fear, lack 
of control and apprehension about catastrophic potential. The latter refers to lack of 
knowledge of the risk that could be unobservable, novel, and possibly have important 
delayed effects.  Clearly, one could argue that with good information, people might be 
able to understand the risks better; however, this alone would not necessarily help 
people overcome their fear. 
 
A related issue is whether people’s concern’s about one source of risk affects 
their attitudes toward other sources.  For example, imagine that you have been 
sensitized to risk in one area of your life, e.g., you are concerned about the outcome of 
a medical treatment. Will this affect how you view risks in other areas?  The evidence 
suggests that it will.  People’s assessments of risk have been found to be affected by 
their general emotional state, e.g., if you are scared, you are likely to see risks as 
generally greater than if you are not.
8  As a further example, the attacks involving 
anthrax were seen by the general public to signal far greater risk precisely because of 
their temporal proximity to September 11, 2001.  However, there is now considerable 
doubt as to whether the same terrorist organization was responsible for both the 
attacks on September 11 and the letters contaminated by anthrax.  
 
To summarize, risk involves some chance of a negative – or bad – outcome 
occurring.  The extent of risk therefore depends on both the size of the probability of 
the event occurring and the size of the negative outcome.  In dealing with many risks, 
however, people (and even insurance companies) do not have access to data that 
allows them to assess and calculate risks in a rational manner.  They therefore rely on 
more tacit or intuitive ways of dealing with risk that involve feelings or emotions; in 
addition, imagination plays an important role.  Tacit or intuitive knowledge, however, 
is limited by past experience and imagination may be insufficient or unrealistic. In 
addition, both can be affected by the context of immediate experience that may or 
may not be relevant to the issues at hand. 
 
Insurance after September 11, 2001          
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Let us now return to the aftermath of September 11 and address some specific 
issues.  How have the terrorist attacks affected the way that we experience and assess 
risk?  Second, how have these affected insurance markets?   
 
To answer the first question, it should be quite clear that the terrorist attacks 
have not affected the way that we all experience and assess risk.  However, what the 
unforgettable television images have undoubtedly done is to increase our awareness 
of the possibility of terrorist attacks and the nightmarish quality of potential 
outcomes.  At the same time, we – the general public – have become much more 
knowledgeable about the way terrorist networks operate, the effects of religious 
fundamentalism, and the limits to which fanatics are prepared to go in order to 
achieve their goals.  For example, although most Westerners were aware of suicide 
bombers, the idea of killing oneself for a religious cause is not part of our way of 
seeing the world.  September 11 helped us understand that we have a very small 
worldview.  
 
From the viewpoint of understanding risk, what September 11 highlights is the 
two-edged nature of knowledge.   On the one hand, if we are unaware of certain 
possibilities – i.e., we cannot even imagine them – we clearly cannot regard these 
events as risky.  However, if we do gain some knowledge of their possibility, our 
awareness leads to feelings of risk even though, from an objective viewpoint, there 
may be no difference in the world except for our awareness.  Moreover, if this 
knowledge is imperfect, and we know it is imperfect, then our assessment of the risk 
could well be biased by a number of different, unknown factors.   
 
At the individual level, one could argue that the fact that one person has 
become aware of a risk may not be of great importance.  However – and this is one of 
the critical factors of September 11 – when many people become aware of a risk, the 
implications are quite different.  A classic illustration can be provided by what 
happens in certain kinds of bank failures.  If one person senses a risk that a bank will 
fail and so withdraws his or her funds, this would typically have little effect on the 
bank. However, if that person communicates that feeling to others, and they to others, 
soon so many people will want to withdraw their funds that they will in fact bring 
about the failure of the bank.  Panics can sometimes be instigated by totally erroneous 
information. People, it should be remembered, are social animals and much of what 
we know – including information about what is and what is not risky – is learned 
through social interaction. Thus, a critical part of managing situations such as the 
aftermath of September 11 depends on whether people can trust what they are told by 
government officials, elected representatives, or the media.  If we cannot believe what 
we are told, our general sense of risk is accentuated.   
 
As to the insurance markets, there are a number of effects.  First, the 
destruction of property and lives by the terrorists was huge.  Moreover, it would be 
fair to state that all the property (or at least almost all) was insured against all kinds of 
calamities and many claims have also been made in terms of life insurance, medical 
claims, loss of earnings, the ability of firms to operate, and so on.  Thus in the short 
term, insurance companies had to pay out huge sums of money.  In fact, it has been 
reported that the claims submitted to Lloyds of London represented the largest single 
loss in its venerable 300-year history. Indeed, special facilities had to be extended to 
Lloyds in order for payments to be made on time.  Second, despite the short-term   11
difficulties of meeting the payments attributable to September 11, the immediate 
prospects for the insurance market were seen to be quite rosy. For example, two 
months after September 11, the stock price of the large German insurance group 
Allianz had risen 31%; the price of its large French competitor, Axa, had risen 44%.  
In other words, shortly after September 11, investors believed that   insurance was a 
good business.   
 
Why should investors believe that an industry that has just suffered huge 
losses is going to do exceptionally well in the future?  The answer can be found in our 
previous discussion. First, the effect of September 11 was to increase people’s 
perception of the level of general uncertainty in the world and their imagination of the 
kinds of negative events that could occur.  This uncertainty, in turn, engendered a 
desire to take actions that can reduce the uncertainty.  Many kinds of actions are 
possible.  For example, one can avoid taking airplane flights and thereby reduce some 
obvious risks. (In fact, in October 2001, major US air carriers reported reductions of 
between 25% and 33% in passenger traffic.)  People can also take out insurance to 
protect themselves from many different kinds of potential losses, e.g., destruction of 
homes, the need for medical treatment, and so on.  They may also decide that, in light 
of recent events, their current insurance coverage is insufficient and that they need to 
protect themselves against larger potential losses. In other words, one major effect of 
September 11 was to increase the demand for insurance.  And, when demand for a 
product increases, suppliers (in this case insurance companies) can be more selective 
with their customers and also increase prices.   
 
However, there is another reason why insurance companies increased prices 
and this also relates to increased uncertainty. Simply stated, before September 11 
insurance companies had never faced such a devastating loss.  Moreover, this one loss 
makes an approach to assessing risk based on looking at past data anomalous.  The 
past data approach works only really when you are dealing with many relatively small 
losses over time that occur in a manner that allows premiums to be calculated in a 
straightforward way (see above).  However, catastrophes – like September 11 – send a 
signal that the world might have changed and that the kinds of losses that will occur in 
the future may be different from what happened in the past.   
 
When thinking about the effects of September 11 on insurance, it is 
illuminating to consider three classes of events. The first are events that have nothing 
to do with terrorism, e.g., automobile theft. The second is insurance for events that are 
directly related to terrorism such as clauses that specifically provide coverage against 
acts of terrorism in the insurance contracts of, say, commercial airlines or large 
commerical properties.  The third class are events that, although not directly 
attributable to terrorism, could be linked conceptually to possible terrorist acts. 
Consider, for example, general health and life insurance, claims for damage from fire 
or floods and other events that could be triggered by acts of terror, and so on.   
 
Clearly, there is no reason to believe that September 11 should have any effect 
on the first class of events. However, it is easy to understand how the availability in 
imagination of the events of that day would affect the second and third class of events.  
In short, when dealing with potentially catastrophic events, insurance companies act 
in ways similar to individuals – they try to avoid risk. Thus, less than six months after 
September 11, a statement by Richard J. Hillman of the United States General   12
Accounting Office reported to Congress that “both insurers and resinsurers have 
determined that terrorism is not an insurable risk at this time.”
9 In his testimony, 
Hillman stressed that insurers were specifically withdrawing from providing 
insurance against terrorist attacks or, if they did so, were demanding very high prices. 
For example,  
 
An owner and operator of a midwestern city’s principal airport and several 
smaller airports reportedly experienced a 280 percent increase in its aviation 
liability premium for 2002. The new policy does not include war risk. The 
insurer offered $50 million in war risk and terrorism coverage back to the 
airport owner in a stand-alone policy for a premium of $1 million. The owner 
needs $500 million in coverage to satisfy its obligation to customers.
10  
 
  Similarly, Hillman reported cases where the owners of large buildings in cities 
were unable to obtain insurance coverage against possible acts of terrorism. In effect, 
many major buildings now no longer have insurance against terrorist acts or have less 
than adequate coverage – often with the implicit agreement of mortgage holders and 
other financial stakeholders who previously required insurance against possible 
terrorist acts. 
 
  It is clear that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have greatly affected 
the market for certain kinds of insurance in the United States as well as the general 
business climate.  As noted above, given a general sense of insecurity in the world,  
people may well be interested in demanding insurance against a wider range of risks 
and insurance companies will be tempted to raise prices (possibly also hoping to  
offset losses induced by September 11 – related events). However, what is not clear at 
the present time is whether the current perception of risk will prevail or, on the other 
hand, simply have a transitory effect. One way of thinking about this is to see how 
insurance markets have reacted to other catastrophes in the past.  Consider, for 
example, the experience in California following the 1994 Northridge earthquake.  
Here, the vast majority of insurers involved in providing earthquake insurance on 
homeowners policies either stopped providing insurance or imposed strict limits on 
their policies.
11   
 
  At one level, the similarity of these reactions is easy to understand.  The 
occurrence of a catastrophic event is costly and the fact that it has occurred suggests 
that it could happen again.   In addition, whereas it simple to think about the theory of 
insurance by making an analogy to gambling, there is a substantial psychological 
difference between gambling in a game such as, say, roulette where the probabilities 
of losses and gains can be calculated precisely and events such as terrorist attacks and 
earthquakes where the appropriate probabilties are not evident. Our beliefs about the 
probabilities of future earthquakes or terrorist attacks are clearly going to be affected 
by what happens in the short and medium term.  If there are no major terrorist attacks 
                                                 
9 Hillman, Richard J., (2002). Terrorism insurance: Rising uninsured exposure to attacks heightens 
potential economic vulnerabilities. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives (February 27). GAO-02-
472T. 
10 Hillman, ibid,  p. 11. 
11 Jaffee, D. W.,  & Russell, T. (1997). Catastrophe insurance, capital markets, and uninsurable risks. 
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in the next few years, then it is probable that people’s perceptions of the risk could 
diminish.  On the other hand, another major attack could convince people that the 
risks are even greater.  As indicated above, this is one reason why the anthrax attacks 
had such an impact in the fall of 2001. 
 
There is clearly a need for insurance against terrorist attacks and other 
potentially catastrophic events.  Moreover, in the developed world, markets typically 
arise to meet such needs. Why then, is the market for catastrophic insurance such an 
exception and what, if anything, can or should be done about this?  The fundamental 
reason probably lies in the fact that, in order to face potential catastrophic risks, 
insurance companies need to maintain large amounts of liquid capital.  However, 
according to Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell
12, this is not facilitated in the US by 
institutional factors that involve, inter alia, accounting regulations, tax laws, and the 
threat of takeover of companies with large cash reserves.  Indeed, Jaffee and Russell 
state that the failure of the insurance market to provide coverage against catastrophic 
events is due to idiosyncracies or failures in the capital markets as opposed to 
problems with insurance per se.  On the other hand, Howard Kunreuther has pointed 
out that even if potential investors are offered the chance to buy what seem like quite 
profitable catastrophe bonds (i.e., so-called “cat bonds”), there is considerable 
reluctance to do so.
13 In other words, there is considerable aversion to investing in 
companies or financial instruments that depend on events that are characterized by 
large potential losses and unknown probabilities (however small the reasonable upper 
bounds of these probabilities might be). 
 
In fact, many countries in the Western world now have policies whereby 
governments have effectively agreed to become the insurers of last resort in the case 
of catastrophes. This is the case, for example, in Great Britain, France and Israel 
although what differs between countries is the methods governments use to build up 
necessary funds across time, e.g., by imposing a levy on all private insurance 
contracts (France), a “pool” or risk-sharing appoach (UK), or specific taxes on 
property (Israel).  As can be seen, however, the final costs of insuring against 
catastrophes is borne by the citizens of each country; what varies is how such costs 
are borne by different segments of the population. Currently (September 2002), it is 
this issue that is being debated in the US.   
 
Finally, we referred above to the fact that the share prices of insurance 
companies rebounded quickly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.  Subsequently 
(through September 2002), share prices have dropped considerably along with the 
share prices of almost all sectors of business activity.  However, it would be foolish to 
attribute this drop in prices on the events of September 11, 2001. Instead, it is much 
more indicative of the general malaise in share prices that has swept over the world 
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Should we change what we do? 
 
It is clear that the events of September 11, 2001 have had important effects on 
insurance markets. But, has the world really become a more risky place in which to 
live and should we change our behavior in consequence?  In addition, how can the 
concepts of risk and insurance help us deal with the threats posed by terrorism?  
 
As noted above, one effect of September 11 has been to increase our general 
awareness of risk. However, if it were possible to establish an objective measure of 
risk, an argument could be made that the world has become a less risky environment. 
The reason is that since September 11 society has started taking actions that reduce 
risk.  For example, security at airports  – although far from perfect  – has been 
increased; emergency planning and procedures have been established in many public 
locations; there is a heightened state of surveillance in many public services; and so 
on.  Paradoxically, the mere existence of these measures can accentuate the perception 
of risks of which we were previously unaware thereby making the world seem more 
risky. On the other hand, this assessment could be quite wrong in the sense that none 
of these measures are sufficient to overcome the increased risks that terrorist groups 
are willing to impose on society.  In other words, assessing the “real” level of risk is 
quite complex because it depends on the actions taken by many different parties. 
 
We can also ask whether the world is a more risky environment than it was, 
say, 100 years ago.  When we think of all the dangers of modern technology, most 
people’s immediate reaction is to say that it is more risky or dangerous.  Certainly, it 
is easier now to imagine ways in which the planet can be put at peril and by which we 
could all die. Indeed, hardly a day passes without the media reporting on disasters that 
occur in different parts of the world  – whether induced by natural causes (e.g., 
earthquakes, floods) or human actions (e.g., wars, technological failures, and so on). 
Humans possess the means to impose massive destruction and we cannot necessarily 
control who has and does not have access to such technology.  On the other hand, it is 
also true that life expectancy has increased dramatically over the last century and, on 
this basis alone, one could argue that the world has become a lot safer. What has 
changed is the nature of the risks that we now face.  For example, whereas we have 
learned to reduce many risks faced by our ancestors such as those induced by lack of 
appropriate sanitation in urban areas (that killed millions), our civilization has 
invented new hazards with catastrophic potential. 
 
  Above we alluded to the similarity between risks from terrorism and risks 
from earthquakes. Both can occur at unpredictable moments and have catastrophic 
consequences. However, there is a critical difference between the two.  Earthquakes 
are a natural occurrence; acts  of terrorism are not.  This means, therefore, that 
whereas – as humans – we have to accept the inevitability of earthquakes, this is not 
necessarily the case with terrorism although we do need to be realistic. 
 
  In addition to the events of September 11, r ecent years have shown that 
individuals or small groups can have access to materials that can be used for terrorist 
acts.  Consider, for example, the IRA in the United Kingdom, the ETA group in 
Spain, the Oklahoma bombing in the United States, the Kashmire dispute, suicide 
bombers in the Middle East, and so on.  In addition, disturbed individuals who engage   15
in deadly shooting rampages should also be thought of as terrorists.  One lesson 
society should have learned from recent years is that despite all the safeguards that 
have been implemented against potential terrorist acts, deranged individuals are 
capable of creating new methods of terrorism of which we are not yet aware. In short, 
although acts of terrorism are not inevitable at a conceptual level, the world needs to 
act as though they are. 
 
  This therefore raises the issue of how the concepts of risk and insurance can be 
used as tools to enable society to deal with terrorism.  As noted at the outset of this 
chapter, one of the defining dimensions of risk is the probability of negative 
consequences occurring.  And indeed, society recognizes this.  Consider, for example, 
all the safety measures that have been installed at airports and public buildings to 
reduce the chances that people can carry out acts of terror.  Consider too the actions 
taken by the United States and its allies to eliminate the Al Qaeda terrorist group and 
similar organizations around the world.  All these measures, however, are limited in 
the sense that they accept the status quo of terrorist groups and do not necessarily 
reach the root causes of many acts of terrorism.  Why, we should ask, do so many 
people want to join terrorist groups and engage in such horrendous acts?   Although 
the reasons are undoubtedly complex, I strongly suspect that the root causes involve 
prejudice, ignorance, and a hopeless sense of inequality.  Indeed, I fear that the 
probability of continued terrorist acts will remain high until these ills are mitigated 
and this therefore raises the issue of what the world community is actually doing 
about them. 
 
  In dealing with potential acts of terrorism, insurance per se can be no more 
than a palliative.  However, at a conceptual level, we can ask the question of what 
premium we would be prepared to pay reduce the level of terrorism that is engendered 
by the potential root causes mentioned above. For example, as a society we are 
willing to spend billions of dollars in safety measures and military campaigns to 
contain potential acts of terrorism that we can identify.  Why then are we not willing 
to spend similar sums on programs that will foster health and education and help to 
eliminate prejudices?  As noted above, there is a kind of precedent.  In the late 19
th 
century, the western world started insuring against many diseases by installing 
sanitation facilities in urban areas.  The effect was so dramatic that now we all take 
this “health coverage” for granted.  In similar fashion, massive investment in 
education in developing countries may be the “best” premium we can pay to reduce 
the risks of potential terrorist activity in the future. 
 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 